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Summary 
This article examines the impact of the recession on collective bargaining in Romania, 
focusing on legislative changes and developments in the public health care and the 
construction sectors. Prior to the recession, Romania had a legal system that supported 
dialogue between trade unions, employers and the government, resulting in widespread 
collective bargaining at all levels. In 2011, the government scrapped all collective agreements 
and changed, without parliamentary debate, the main labour laws, making it impossible to 
have cross-sectoral collective agreements and far more difficult to negotiate collective 
agreements at the sectoral, multi-employer and company levels. The recession was thus used 
by the centre-right government as a pretext to reform the industrial relations system. 
Résumé 
Cet article, qui examine l'impact de la récession sur la négociation collective en 
Roumanie, se concentre sur les changements législatifs et les développements dans 
les secteurs des soins de santé publique et de la construction. Avant la récession, la 
Roumanie était dotée d’un système juridique qui encourageait le dialogue entre les 
syndicats, les employeurs et le gouvernement, permettant une négociation collective 
généralisée à tous les niveaux. En 2011, le gouvernement a aboli toutes les 
conventions collectives et a modifié, sans débat parlementaire, les principales lois en 
matière de travail, ce qui a rendu impossibles les conventions collectives 
transsectorielles et a freiné la négociation des conventions collectives aux niveaux 
sectoriel, multi-employeurs et de l’entreprise. La récession a donc été utilisée par le 
gouvernement de centre-droite comme prétexte pour réformer le système des 
relations professionnelles. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit den Auswirkungen der Rezession auf die 
Tarifverhandlungen in Rumänien, insbesondere in Bezug auf die gesetzlichen 
Änderungen und Entwicklungen im öffentlichen Gesundheitswesen und im 
Bausektor. Vor der Rezession bestand in Rumänien ein Rechtssystem, das den 
Dialog zwischen Gewerkschaften, Arbeitgebern und Regierung unterstützte und zu 
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einer weiten Verbreitung von Tarifverhandlungen auf allen Ebenen geführt hatte. Im 
Jahr 2011 verwarf die Regierung sämtliche Tarifvereinbarungen und änderte – ohne 
parlamentarische Debatte – die wichtigsten Arbeitsgesetze. Durch diese 
Änderungen wurde es unmöglich, branchenübergreifende Tarifverträge 
abzuschließen, und wesentlich schwieriger, Branchen- und 
Unternehmenstarifvereinbarungen sowie Vereinbarungen mehrerer Arbeitgeber 
auszuhandeln. Die Rezession wurde also von der Mitte-Rechts-Regierung als 
Vorwand benutzt, um das System der Arbeitsbeziehungen zu reformieren. 
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Bohle and Greskovits (2012) argue that Romania has a special type of neoliberal capitalism 
with weak state institutions, high centralization and collective bargaining coverage, and with 
trade unions having relatively high mobilization power. Prior to 2010, Romania had a 
comprehensive industrial relations system, with widespread collective bargaining at national, 
sectoral and company levels and with the legal system supporting bipartite and tripartite 
consultation and negotiation between trade unions, employers and the government (Trif, 
2010). However, this system has been radically overhauled by the government1 since 2010, 
despite opposition from trade unions and several employer associations (Ciutacu, 2012). The 
legislative changes have led to a forced decentralization of collective bargaining and made it 
more difficult for unions to bargain collectively. In contrast to Bohle and Greskovits’ (2012) 
argument that Romania has a weak state lacking the capacity to implement reforms due to 
union resistance, the recent changes in collective bargaining have left Romania with a 
relatively strong state and weak unions. 
After a brief analysis of the economic and political consequences of the financial 
crisis, the article discusses the main legislative changes concerning collective bargaining. It 
goes on to discuss developments in collective bargaining in two industries: health care, an 
industry broadly representative of the public sector which was severely affected by the 
austerity measures introduced in 2009 and 2010; and construction, the private sector industry 
worst hit by the economic crisis, and the one with the most developed collective bargaining 
institutions in the private sector (Ciutacu, 2011). This study of two sectors severely affected – 
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though in different ways – by the crisis, aims at analysing how recent economic 
developments and political factors have influenced change in collective bargaining 
institutions. The article concludes with a broader discussion of the findings. The empirical 
data are based on in-depth interviews conducted in 2012 with 10 union officials and two 
industrial relations experts. 
The financial crisis and its economic and political consequences 
The international financial crisis severely affected economic and social developments in 
Romania after 2008. Gross domestic product (GDP) slumped by 6.6 per cent in 2009 
followed by a further 1.6 per cent drop in 2010, indicating a more severe economic downturn 
than in Bulgaria (which had a similar level of economic growth before the crisis) and the EU 
average (Figure 1). The construction sector was worst hit, losing 14 per cent of its value 
added to GDP in 2009, followed by agriculture (–7.8 per cent) and services (Zaman and 
Georgescu, 2009). Though overall employment has only declined by 1.2 per cent since 2008, 
there are major variations across sectors – while the construction labour force shrank by 9 per 
cent, employment increased slightly in the health care sector (Table 1). Unemployment has 
remained virtually unchanged at around 7 per cent since 2008, reflecting the limited 
contraction of the total labour force. Average wage increases have been below the inflation 
rate since 2008 (Figure 2), indicating that trade unions have not managed to safeguard 
employee purchasing power. 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth, Romania, Bulgaria and EU-25, 2001–2012. 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 (from excel file) HERE 
Source: Eurostat (2012). 
Figure 2. Romania – wages and inflation, 2008–2011. 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 (from excel file) HERE 
Source: Eurostat (2012). 
Table 1. Employment by economic activity. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Source: Eurostat (2012). 
There are three sets of interrelated reasons for the economic downturn in Romania. 
First, despite the limited proportion of toxic assets in its banking system, Romania was 
exposed to the adverse effects of the global financial crisis primarily due to its openness to 
foreign capital (foreign stakeholders account for over 85 per cent of total banking assets) 
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(Zaman and Georgescu, 2009). Moreover, foreign direct investment (FDI) dropped by almost 
50 per cent in 2009 compared to 2008 (Constantin et al., 2011). Secondly, there was a decline 
in domestic and international demand for goods and services, with Romanian exports to the 
EU (the main trading partner) dropping by 25 per cent in 2009 (European Commission, 
2010). In addition, wage reductions for many workers and the decline of remittances from 
abroad reduced private consumption by 9 per cent (Constantin et al., 2011). The third set of 
factors refers to the economic weakness that already existed before 2008 and the lack of 
proactive measures to stimulate economic growth, with pre-2008 growth primarily fuelled by 
the consumption of imported goods and real-estate sales. Despite economic growth between 
2000 and 2008, the budget deficit kept on increasing (Constantin et al., 2011), and Romania 
was forced to borrow €20bn from the IMF, EU and the World Bank in 2010 to tackle the 
budget deficit. This financial assistance was conditional on the government adopting austerity 
measures. 
The austerity measures and the arbitrary way the reforms were pushed through 
without social dialogue led to a substantial decline in the popularity of the centre-right 
coalition in power between 2008 and 2012 (Daborowski, 2012). The coalition introduced 
some of the most restrictive austerity measures in the EU, slashing salaries in the public 
sector by 25 per cent and reducing numerous social benefits in 2010 (Trif, 2010). Though this 
reduced the budget deficit from 9 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 4.9 per cent in 2011, budget 
cuts were at the expense of living standards (Daborowski, 2012). The controversial 
privatization of mineral extraction companies and the attempt to privatize the health care 
system led to growing public opposition, ultimately contributing to the collapse of the 
government in February 2012. A new government led by Ungureanu was installed by the 
centre-right political coalition, only to collapse fewer than three months later. 
In May 2012, a centre-left coalition came to power. Led by Victor Ponta, the new 
government decided to take measures to enhance its support within the population, for 
instance increasing public sector salaries by 8 per cent in June 2012 and increasing taxes for 
the rich (Financial Magazine, 2012). These wage increases were not however negotiated with 
the unions. 
Looking at the main changes to the labour laws since 2008, these were all introduced 
unilaterally by the governments in power – whether centre-right or centre–left – as so-called 
‘emergency decrees’. The latter were used extensively to pass laws without public or 
parliamentary debate, indicating a return to authoritarian decision-making practices similar to 
those used before 1990. 
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Government attack on collective bargaining institutions 
In 2011, the centre-right government introduced the most sweeping changes to collective 
bargaining legislation since the collapse of the Communist regime (Ciutacu, 2011). In 
addition to the unilateral amendment of the Labour Code (facilitating hire-and-fire practices), 
the government abolished the laws governing collective bargaining since 1991 and 
introduced a new Social Dialogue Act (SDA) that changed collective bargaining processes at 
all levels. 
At cross-sectoral level, a unique national collective agreement was in force until 
2011, stipulating minimum rights and obligations for the entire labour force in Romania. 
Under it, representative union and employer confederations set minimum standards in terms 
of the minimum wage (equal or above the level set by government), working time and 
working conditions. The new legislation no longer allows the social partners to negotiate 
cross-sectoral collective agreements, leading to a decentralization of collective bargaining 
and weakening bargaining coordination, as the unique national collective agreement used to 
be the minimum reference point for collective bargaining at the lower levels. In 2012, the 
minimum wage was set by the government at €162 a month (a 4.5 per cent year-on-year 
increase slightly below the inflation rate). The SDA makes it easier for employers to cut 
declared wages for highly qualified employees to the minimum wage and instead to make 
additional cash payments, thereby avoiding tax. The national collective agreement had 
hitherto specified pay rates linked to training and education levels, which meant that highly 
qualified employees could not be paid the minimum wage. The Labour Inspectorate reported 
that over 630 000 full-time employees were paid the minimum wage in 2012, an increase of 
around 200 000 on the previous year. 
The legislative changes, together with the difficulties encountered by social partners 
in gaining representative status, made it impossible to negotiate collective agreements at 
sectoral level until May 2012. Previously, social partners fulfilling the representativeness 
criteria had been able to negotiate collective agreements at branch level covering all 
employees and employers in a specific branch. In 2011, the social partners agreed on 32 
branches eligible for collective bargaining, 20 of which had collective agreements. All these 
agreements were scrapped by the government at the end of 2011. The SDA stipulates that 
branch agreements are to be replaced by sectoral agreements that can be applied in 29 
economic sectors. The social partners have to re-register with the local court and prove that 
they are representative at sectoral level. Trade unions and employers can also negotiate 
collective agreements for a group of companies from the same sector. The new collective 
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agreements generally apply only to employers belonging to the employer organizations 
signatory to the agreement. As there is no statutory extension of collective agreements, there 
is less coordination within the economic sectors. 
The SDA makes it more difficult for trade unions to negotiate agreements at 
company level for two main reasons. First, there is further downward pressure on 
employment standards due to a lack of collective agreements setting minimum conditions at 
higher levels. Secondly, there are major procedural changes regarding collective bargaining. 
Local unions have to re-register with the local court to be entitled to negotiate collective 
agreements. Many local unions have lost their representative status, as the new law stipulates 
that union density needs to be at least 51 per cent of a company’s workforce compared to 
one-third under the old law. If union density is lower or there is no union representation in a 
company, elected employee representatives are allowed to negotiate collective agreements. 
Previously, local union officials could get up to five days off per month for union activities 
paid by the employer, while under the new law the employer is not obliged to pay any time 
off. Also, the new law makes it far more difficult to organize workers in small and medium-
sized enterprises. It requires a minimum of 15 workers from the same company to form a 
union, while previously 15 employees working in the same profession or branch could form a 
union. The SDA makes is impossible for unions to bargain collectively in over 90 per cent of 
Romanian companies with fewer than 15 employees (Barbuceanu, 2012). 
Three main methods were used to reduce union influence and their role in collective 
bargaining at all levels. First, there were the legislative changes which made it far more 
difficult for unions to bargain collectively, as discussed above. In addition, the government 
outlawed the practice of employers deducting union dues from wages, making it more 
difficult for unions to collect dues. Secondly, the respondents suggested that there had been 
an organized campaign to intimidate and discredit the leaders of the five main confederations. 
The most notorious case was the 2011 arrest of Marius Petcu, the leader of largest union 
confederation, CNSRL Fratia and the Sanitas Federation, following an argument with 
President Basescu about the health care budget (senior union official, Sanitas). Another 
senior union official reported that he was accused of tax evasion after an argument with the 
President and that the police had been sent to his house. The subsequent legal proceedings 
had proved his innocence. Nevertheless, many commentators have stated that certain union 
leaders are corrupt. Petcu for instance was arrested for allegedly accepting a bribe from a 
businessman supposed to perform construction work at a union centre (Barbuceanu, 2012). 
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Finally, union legitimacy was affected by the fact that the government ignored 
virtually all union recommendations. Although a special tripartite commission consisting of 
representatives of unions, employers and the government had been formed to deal with the 
economic crisis and had agreed to implement over 400 measures, at the end of the day the 
government only implemented three of them (Trif, 2010). One of these provisions stipulated 
that employees were entitled to 75 per cent of their wages for a limited period of 
unemployment when companies were going through a period of low demand for their 
products or services, with neither the employer nor employees having to pay wage taxes. 
Implemented in 2010 for three months, the government scrapped the measure in 2011. Union 
legitimacy was further damaged by the fact that the mass demonstrations organized by unions 
against the new labour laws and wage cuts had no impact on government policies (Ciutacu, 
2011). Put in a nutshell, the government leveraged the recession to curb union power, as 
demonstrated also by collective bargaining developments in the health care and construction 
sectors. 
Developments in the health care sector 
Developments in the health care sector illustrate the issues faced by public sector employees 
during the recent recession. The Romanian health care sector employs around 400 000 
employees, approximately 85 per cent of whom work in the public health care sector (Chivu, 
2011). Public health care spending was around 4 per cent of GDP in 2011, far lower than the 
EU average (Gensior, 2012). In attempts to make better use of the limited resources, the 
health sector has been subject to successive reforms over the last 20 years primarily seeking 
its decentralization and liberalization. The centre-right government planned to introduce 
extensive privatization of public hospitals and clinics as a way of cutting state spending. 
However, the draft bill was withdrawn after the reform plan came under heavy criticism from 
doctors, the general public and the social partners as well as the Deputy Ministry of Health 
(Gensior, 2012). It was argued that the privatization of public hospitals would make medical 
treatment unaffordable for a large segment of the population. Nevertheless, health care 
reforms are likely to remain on the new government’s agenda in an attempt to optimize 
resources. 
The austerity measures imposed by the government had a significant impact on 
collective bargaining in the health care sector. Before the recession, the five union federations 
representing health care workers managed to increase wages for their members through 
branch-level collective bargaining from 89 per cent of the national average salary in 2004 to 
98 per cent in 2008, making the most of the economic boom and staff shortages (Chivu, 
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2011). A study conducted by Rotila and Celmare (2007) showed that 58 per cent of managers 
of the public health care organizations indicated a shortage of staff (doctors and nurses) due 
to emigration and over 90 per cent of managers considered that higher wages and better 
conditions were required to retain staff. In spite of staff shortages, the government 
unilaterally cut the wages of health care employees by 25 per cent in 2010 as part of the 
public sector wage cuts. In addition, despite the provisions of the branch’s collective 
agreement for 2008–2010, employees did not receive the so-called ‘13th salary’ (a 
supplementary month’s wage), bonuses linked to seniority and overtime payments. 
Interviewed union officials stated that health care workers’ wages had dropped by around 40 
per cent in 2010, while their workloads had increased and unpaid overtime had been required 
to make sure that patients were safe in hospitals. They indicated that most hospitals could not 
afford to employ new staff due to budget constraints. Despite having a valid collective 
agreement, the terms and conditions of employment stipulated in the agreement have been 
unilaterally downgraded by the government. A union official reported that: 
‘There were many protests in 2010 and 2011 organized by Sanitas and CNSRL Fratia 
against legislative changes and the major cut in salaries, with no positive results for 
union members; these protests were very expensive for the union and difficult to 
organize; as a result, Sanitas has found it very difficult to organize national-level 
protests in 2012.’ (Senior union official, Sanitas) 
The costs of organizing unsuccessful protests in a context of declining membership 
and the arrest of the leader of the largest union confederation have considerably reduced the 
capacity of unions to mobilize their members. 
The unions managed to conclude a collective agreement in 2011, valid between 
August and December 2011. This agreement was similar to the previous one, except there 
were no longer any provisions regarding the amount of annual leave, paid overtime or 
precarious conditions. Meal vouchers were also withdrawn. According to the two local union 
officials, the provisions of the 2011 collective agreement were still being applied in their 
organizations in 2012, though they could not be legally enforced should any problems arise. 
It was very difficult to start the 2012 collective negotiations due to the provisions of the new 
labour laws as well as the fragmentation of health care administration.2 The new 
administrators did not form an employers’ association at sectoral level, meaning that unions 
had no partner to negotiate with. Furthermore, it took unions several months to re-register 
with the local court. The largest union, Sanitas, gained representative status at the end of 
April 2012, while the other unions have not (yet) gained such status. In June 2012, the 
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regional office of Sanitas concluded a collective agreement with a group of 19 hospitals in 
Bucharest, the first agreement concluded in 2012 for a group of companies. 
To assist their members and deal with the reduction of union funds due to the 50 per 
cent decline in union membership, Sanitas has managed to obtain EU Structural Fund funding 
for five sectoral projects, allowing them to provide training to around 10 000 members. With 
these new skills a number of them have been able to earn additional income by working extra 
hours as carers. Those successfully completing the training were eligible to apply for a 
training grant, equivalent to one month’s wage. Although health care unions mobilized their 
members in protest against the new laws and austerity measures, their success and influence 
on collective agreements have remained limited since 2009 (Chivu, 2011). Nevertheless, they 
have adapted to the new conditions and regulations and made an effort to help their members 
in other ways. 
Developments in the construction sector 
The construction sector reflects developments in the private sector worst affected by the 
recent recession. There has been a major drop in construction investment and demand, 
primarily due to cutbacks in bank loans offered to companies and individuals (Mocanu, 2009) 
and limited state infrastructure investment. Nevertheless, the availability of EU Structural 
Funds for the thermal insulation of state-owned buildings since 2009 has somewhat 
cushioned the effects of the recession. The construction sector was one of the first affected by 
the recession in 2009, and one of the last to recover, with demand not picking up until 2012. 
Union officials referred to a chain of subcontracting in the construction sector 
contributing to the exploitation of workers. Generally speaking, multinational companies are 
awarded the major construction contracts. They subsequently subcontract most of the work to 
other relatively large companies which in turn subcontract work to very small companies 
which cannot be unionized; over 90 per cent of construction companies do not have the 
minimum number of employees required to form a union (Ciutacu, 2009). Although 
multinational firms generally provide good conditions to their employees to protect their 
image, the other firms in this subcontracting chain often exploit workers. Prior to 2011, all 
construction firms were covered by the branch collective agreement. However, a large 
number of workers had no employment contract before the recession; it was estimated that 
around one-third of the sector’s total labour force was involved in undeclared work in 2006 
(Ciutacu, 2009). 
To deal with specific sectoral issues, the social partners have developed several 
bipartite institutions since 1997. The construction sector is unique in terms of having a 
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network of bipartite institutions and joint committees that regulate workers’ social protection, 
training, and health and safety, deal with migrant workers and undeclared work, and provide 
private pensions and holiday funds (Ciutacu, 2009). Their development started with the 
establishment in 1998 of the Builders’ Social Fund which manages a social protection fund 
for employees (to which employers, employees and customers contribute) providing 
compensation for periods of inactivity due to bad weather. Over 300 000 employees have 
benefited from winter allowances since 1998. The number of employees receiving winter 
allowances increased by 20 per cent between 2008 and 2011, due to less work being available 
since the recession (Raport annual 2011, 2012). The social partners have used the existing 
bipartite institutions to gain EU Structural Funds for training and to provide support for 
employees during the temporary interruption of work. 
Unlike other sectors, social partner fragmentation is limited in the construction 
sector. There is just one employer association, the Romanian Association of Building 
Entrepreneurs (ARACO) and one trade union, the FGS3. A senior union official reported that 
it was an organic merger, as the two unions had been working together with ARACO to 
develop the bipartite self-regulation institutions. In 2006, the social partners signed the first 
Romanian sectoral social agreement (for 2007–2009), covering a broader range of issues than 
other sectoral collective agreements (Ciutacu, 2007). It included issues such as a regulatory 
framework for complying with EU regulations as well as ensuring that there was no ‘race to 
the bottom’ on employees’ wages, that would enable employers paying the lowest wages to 
win tenders. 
In contrast to the health care sector, the social partners in the construction sector set 
the terms and conditions of employment through collective bargaining during the recession. 
They concluded collective agreements covering all employees in the construction sector until 
2011, when the legislation changed. Although over 65 000 employees have lost their jobs 
since 2008, the minimum wage for construction workers has steadily increased since 2008. In 
2012, it was 7 per cent higher than the national minimum wage. Set by the social partners 
who negotiated an agreement for 2012–2013, it covers only employers and employees 
respectively belonging to ARACO and FGS. The existence of consolidated bipartite 
institutions made it possible for the social partners to negotiate multi-employer agreements, 
despite being the sector worst hit by the economic recession. 
Nevertheless, the unions are finding it far more difficult to negotiate collective 
agreements at company level. Local unions are only allowed to start negotiations when they 
have more than 50 per cent union density. Where this is not the case, the FGS may, together 
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with employee representatives, initiate collective bargaining in unionized companies, but in 
many cases employees do not elect representatives as they are afraid that the latter could be 
fired. Also, an FGS official indicated that there have been cases of intimidation of local union 
officials. Nevertheless, there are some companies where unions enjoy very good relations 
with the employers. The two local union officials interviewed worked in such companies and 
they both reported that ownership changes had a more significant impact on collective 
bargaining than the recession or the recent legislative changes. Both companies had 
previously had senior managers unwilling to enter into a dialogue with the unions. These 
developments indicate that collective bargaining in unionized companies depends primarily 
on the willingness of the local senior management team to negotiate with unions. In addition, 
the new legislation makes it impossible for unions to negotiate collective agreements in over 
90 per cent of the micro-enterprises which carry out the subcontracted construction work, as 
they have fewer than 15 workers. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This article examines the main changes in collective bargaining since 2008. It argues that the 
state hammered the collective bargaining system and imposed its decentralization, primarily 
through legislative changes. The biggest change was at national level, with the SDA making 
it impossible for the social partners to negotiate cross-sectoral collective agreements. 
Moreover, the state declared all sectoral agreements null and void at the end of 2011 and 
made it very difficult to negotiate new sectoral agreements in 2012 due to the new legal 
requirements for the social partners (Barbuceanu, 2012). Union officials reported that very 
few unions managed to negotiate multi-employer collective agreements in 2012. The social 
partners in the construction sector were the first to conclude a sectoral agreement for 2012, 
while the regional office of Sanitas was among the first to conclude a collective agreement 
for a group of companies. Both agreements cover only employees in the companies signatory 
to the agreements, while before 2011 all employees (legally) working in the two sectors were 
covered by branch agreements. This indicates a decentralization and fragmentation of sectoral 
collective bargaining, in line with institutional developments in neoliberal market economies. 
Besides some general trends in collective bargaining observed in both sectors, there 
are striking differences between collective bargaining in health care and construction, 
suggesting that political rather than economic factors were behind the institutional changes in 
collective bargaining. Although the construction sector was the worst affected by market 
forces during the recession, the social partners worked together, leveraging their unique 
bipartite institutions to tackle it. By contrast, the state almost unilaterally established the 
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terms and conditions of employment in the health care sector, disregarding the provisions of 
the collective agreements for all public sector employees between 2009 and 2011, allegedly 
due to the conditions for the loan agreed with the IMF (Trif, 2010). The centre-right 
government unilaterally reduced public sector wages in 2010 by more than 25 percent, while 
increasing them by 15 per cent in June 2011. The new government similarly increased wages 
for public sector employees by 8 per cent in June 2012, without consulting the unions. 
According to union officials, the latest wage increase was a populist measure, as local 
elections and parliamentary elections were due to take place in 2012. In addition, a local 
union official reported that their union had obtained a definitive court judgment in 2009 on 
the payment of arrears to nurses in a public hospital which had illegally reduced their salaries 
for seven years, but that the government had passed an emergency ordinance to invalidate the 
court decision. Considering also that all the main changes in the labour laws since 2008 have 
been introduced unilaterally by the governments through emergency decrees, it could be 
argued that we are witnessing a return to authoritarian decision-making practices. 
In contrast to Bohle and Greskovits’ (2012) argument that Romania has a weak state 
that concedes to union demands, the recent changes in collective bargaining point instead to a 
relatively strong state and weak unions. The government’s disregard for the provisions of 
collective agreements, the legislative changes and the alleged intimidation of union leaders 
have led to a decline of union legitimacy and their influence in collective bargaining. The 
economic crisis has caused a downward trend in trade union membership and mobilization 
power (Trif, 2010). The recession was also used as a pretext by the centre-right government 
to reform the industrial relations system. The so-called Social Dialogue Act was passed 
unilaterally by the government without being debated in parliament and without involving the 
social partners. It should be noted that four (out of 13) national employer associations 
employing over 60 per cent of the active labour force did not support this new legislation 
(Ciutacu, 2012: 2), as it hindered social dialogue and multi-employer collective bargaining. 
The government made statutory changes to the terms and conditions of employment agreed 
by the social partners and abolished all existing collective agreements. The non-democratic 
procedures used to alter industrial relations resemble the authoritarian rule in place before 
1989. Evidence points to a large degree of continuity in terms of strong state intervention in 
industrial relations. We call this type of institutional arrangement authoritarian 
neoliberalism, as change in industrial relations is driven by a strong, interventionist state in 
the field of wage setting that, at the same time, is pushing forward labour market deregulation 
and dismantling workers’ rights. However, it is difficult to foresee whether authoritarian 
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neoliberalism is a transitional stage or whether it will become a long-term institutional 
arrangement. 
Acknowledgements 
The author is grateful to Vera Glassner and the two referees for their excellent suggestions 
for improving this article. Also, I want to thank the respondents for providing valuable insights 
into the impact of the recession on collective bargaining. 
Funding 
This research was supported by Dublin City University. 
References 
Barbuceanu S (2012) Annual Review 2011 on Labour Relations and Social Dialogue in South 
East Europe: Romania. Belgrade: Friedrich-Erbert-Stiftung. Available at: 
www.fes.de/cgi-bin/gbv.cgi?id=08911&ty=pdf. 
Bohle D and Greskovits B (2012) Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
Chivu L (2011) Romania: Industrial Relations in the Health Care Sector. Dublin: European 
Industrial Relations Observatory. Available at: 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn1008022s/ro1008029q.htm. 
Ciutacu C (2009) Builders’ Social Fund, Romania. Dublin: European Industrial Relations 
Observatory. Available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/labourmarket/tackling/cases/ro001.htm. 
Ciutacu C (2011) National unique collective agreement ended by law. Dublin: European 
Industrial Relations Observatory. Available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/07/articles/ro1107029i.htm. 
Ciutacu C (2012) Social partners opt out of social dialogue in protest at new legislation. 
Dublin: European Industrial Relations Observatory. Available at: 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/12/articles/ro1112019i.htm. 
Constantin DL, Goschin Z and Danciu AR (2011) The Romanian Economy from Transition 
to Crisis. Retrospects and Prospects. World Business Institute Australia World 
Journal of Social Sciences 1(3): 155–171. 
Daborowski T (2012) The new ruling coalition in Romania. Available at: 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2012-05-09/new-ruling-coalition-
romania. 





Eurostat (2012) Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes. 
Financial Magazine (2012) After three years will increase wages by restrictive policies. 
Available at: http://www.financial-magazine.org/after-three-years-will-increase-
wages-by-restrictive-policies-70953.html. 
Gensior S (2012) Romania: President blocks the privatization of hospitals. Available at: 
http://europe-health-care.eu/romania-president-blocks-the-privatization-of-hospitals/. 
Mocanu F (2009) Financial Crisis Impact on Construction and Real Estate Sectors in 
Romania. Romanian Economic Business Review 4(3): 127–136. 
Raport anual 2011 (2012) Bucuresti: Casa sociala a constructorilor. Available at: 
http://www.casoc.ro/rapoartepercent20depercent20firma/rapoartepercent20depercent2
0firma.htm. 
Rotila V and Celmare L (2007) Consequences of Romanian health care workers migration. 
The perspective of health care managers. Sociologie 2: 217–228. Galati: Analele 
Universitătii Dunărea de Jos. 
Trif A (2010) Trade union rights in Romania during the economic recession. International 
Union Rights: Journal of the International Centre for Trade Union Rights 17(3): 16–
18. 
Zaman G and Georgescu G (2009) The Impact of the Global Crisis on Romania’s Economic 
Development. Bucharest: Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica 11(2): 
611–624. Available at: www.oeconomica.uab.ro/upload/lucrari/1120092/01.pdf. 
                                                 
1The government was led by Prime Minister Emil Boc from December 2004 to 
February 2012. Boc’s first government fell in October 2009, after losing a 
motion of no confidence in Parliament. Boc was reinstated by the President 
and formed a new government which collapsed in February 2012, following 
social protests due to austerity measures. 
2 Around 25 per cent of hospitals are still run by the Ministry of Health, while others 
are run by the local councils or have some other form of ownership. Moreover, 
many hospitals have been closed down. 
3 The two largest unions merged in 2009 to become the Familia ‘Angel Saligny’ 
General Union Federation (FGS), which is affiliated to CNS Cartel Alfa. The 
merger was not linked to the recession. 
